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Mike Thicke†
David Tyfield’s two-volume The Economics of Science is an ambitious
aempt to explain recent developments in economics of science using a critical
realist/Marxian framework, and at the same time to unite critical realism
with science and technology studies. The first volume consists of empirical
illustrations of Tyfield’s approach along with some philosophical arguments for
critical realism in general and a Marxian approach to the economics of science
specifically. The second volume focuses on achieving a synthesis between
Tyfield’s approach, science and technology studies, and evolutionary economics.
The growing number of intellectual property claims in science—most visibly,
in the form of patents and the increasing focus by universities on for-profit
research—has been the subject of much recent work in STS. Even mainstream
philosophers of science, notorious for considering science in a highly abstract
form disconnected from its political and economic reality, have began devoting
aention to these developments (eg. Radder 2010). As Tyfield argues, however,
a significant problem with previous work in STS, the economics of science, and
the philosophy of science is that none have explained why these changes to
science are occurring, and why they are occurring now. Philosophers of science,
for example, concentrate on the effects of these changes on science, and most
of the work in the diverse approaches to the “economics of science” has either
been devoted to answering other questions, or has failed to consider the political
context or the content of the sciences. Tyfield convincingly argues that we need
to consider both in order to understand these worrying developments in the
economics of science.
Tyfield has previously published on the economics of scientific research
within China, and his comparison of the commodification of science in China
with that of the West is detailed and illuminating. The Chinese political system,
where the state drives changes in the way scientific work is organized as part
of its overall economic plan, has created differing paths in the commodification
of scientific research. This empirical investigation effectively demonstrates his
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argument that we cannot understand the changes occurring in science without
also understanding their political context.
Perhaps the strongest chapter of the book is Tyfield’s explanation of
the expansion of intellectual property claims in science. Tyfield notes in his
introduction that one of his goals is to explain “why these changes in the
economics of science [are occurring], in these places, and now” (pg. 13)? His
account, which links the financialization of the economy which began in the
Reagan/Thatcher era, the exhaustion of the chemical and electrical sectors as
sources of innovation, the lobbying efforts of pharmaceutical corporations, and
the nature of biotechnology, provides a convincing narrative.
Tyfield’s framework rests on the foundations of the labour theory of value
and a version of Kant’s transcendental argument. Although from a theoretical
point of view the former has numerous difficulties, one of its chief virtues is its
shi of focus from products to producers. It encourages us to think of a T-shirt or
a can of Coke as “congealed labour” rather than as inanimate objects subjected
to the forces of supply and demand. In the closing chapters of the second volume,
Tyfield aempts to use this explanatory power to transform the discourse of
economics of science from the “knowledge economy” to the “skillful society”—
moving away from thinking about science as a set of finished knowledge
products towards the view that it is a process of learning by cooperating
individuals.
Kant’s transcendental arguments began with obvious premises about our
mental states and reasoned towards controversial conclusions about the external
world. Arguments of this sort are at best highly controversial, and thus do
not provide a solid foundation upon which to build a theoretical framework.
However, Tyfield’s version, adopted fromRoy Bhaskar’s critical realism (Bhaskar
1978), has some promising features. His basic strategy is to ask: what does
the commodification of science presuppose? It is transcendental in that it
seeks to move from an uncontroversial premise (that scientific research can be
commodified) to controversial conclusions about what must be the case in order
for that premise to be true. In contrast to Kant’s argument, Tyfield’s argument
is supposed to be tentative; the result of his transcendental reasoning might
be that, because the conclusions are untenable, the supposed uncontroversial
premises might be judged false. In the context of economics of science, Tyfield
argues that, for the commodification of scientific knowledge to be successful,
markets for knowledge have to be created, and knowledge has to be made
objectively quantifiable. He then argues that the difficulty of such quantification
explains many features of the current institutional apparatus developed in order
to establish intellectual property rights. This is an interesting and original line
of reasoning, as very lile aention has been given by other studies of the
economics of science to the commodification of scientific knowledge and the
its implications.
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Overall, The Economics of Science is a valuable contribution to the genre,
a book that sociologists, economists, philosophers, or others concerned with
the economic circumstances of science will find worth reading. Tyfield’s writing
style is oen dense, and I am suspicious of his framework from a theoretical
perspective. However, this does not detract from the book’s chief virtues—its
insistence that we take the implications of knowledge commodification
seriously, and that we aend to the need to understand why these changes we
see in science are occurring now and in the ways that they are.
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